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Oman’s mediatory efforts  
in regional crises
 Executive summary
By Marc Valeri
Oman’s role in facilitating the conclusion of the Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal in November 2013 and 
its announcement a few weeks later that it would not join a proposed Gulf union can be under-
stood within a recent history of conciliatory efforts intended to promote negotiated solutions 
to regional crises. Oman has always perceived political instability in the Gulf and West Asia as 
a factor threatening the country’s own internal stability. This perception of political vulnerabil-
ity also explains the sultanate’s determination to prevent foreign actors from interfering in its 
 internal  affairs. The price for this independent foreign policy towards its neighbours has been the 
country’s unquestioned political and military dependence on Britain and the U.S. Given Oman’s 
strategic importance to the security of the entire Gulf, controlling as it does the Strait of Hormuz, 
through which approximately one-third of the world’s seaborne trade in crude petroleum passed 
in 2013, Britain and the U.S. have shared Muscat’s aversion for any disruption of its internal sta-
tus quo and wish to prevent any contamination of Omani territory by unwanted foreign influence.
At the end of 2013 the Sultanate of Oman, whose long-
standing credo has been to attract limited attention in the 
global arena, made the international affairs headlines on 
two occasions. In November, when the interim Geneva 
Agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme was signed 
between the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia and the 
U.S., plus Germany) and Iran, the U.S. media revealed that 
secret meetings between U.S. and Iranian officials had 
taken place in Muscat since March 2013. A few days later, 
in preparation for the 34th Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
summit on December 10th-11th 2013, the Omani minister 
responsible for foreign affairs, Yusuf bin ‘Alawi, declared 
that Oman would not prevent the upgrading of the GCC into 
a union of six countries, but would simply “not be part of it” 
if it happens.1 These successive revelations can be under-
stood as part of Oman’s track record of mediation initia-
tives in regional crises and, more generally, in the perspec-
tive of Oman’s pragmatic foreign policy towards its 
neighbours.
A history of conciliatory efforts to preserve 
 regional stability
The Omani authorities have always perceived political 
instability in the Gulf and West Asia as a factor threatening 
Oman’s internal stability. This perception of political 
vulnerability in a region disrupted by recurrent convulsions 
explains Omani pragmatism in the international arena, 
leading it to emphasise underlying geostrategic realities 
and promote consensus-oriented solutions. Omani initia-
tives to encourage diplomatic rapprochement between 
Pakistan and India in 1985 and to open negotiations during 
the Qatar-Bahrain crisis in 1986 demonstrated this 
 approach. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 Oman disap-
proved of this as a violation of international law. However, it 
was not willing to agree to a military solution and did not 
break off relations with Baghdad. Oman attempted to 
mediate in the crisis when in November 1990 the then-Iraqi 
minister of foreign affairs, Tariq ‘Aziz, made the first official 
Iraqi visit to a GCC state other than Kuwait since the 
invasion.
1 This was the second such statement by Oman, following Yusuf bin ‘Alawi’s clarification in June 2012 that “the GCC union project exists only among journalists”.
2Noref expert Analysis – March 2014
As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sultan Qaboos, the ruler of 
Oman, welcomed the 1978 Camp David agreement and the 
1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and refused to partici-
pate in the March 1979 Arab League summit that expelled 
Egypt. This support promised closer ties with the U.S. and 
Egypt, which undertook to respond to any request from 
Oman for military aid. In April 1994 the then-Israeli deputy 
minister of foreign affairs, Yossi Beilin, participated in talks 
in Oman.2 In 1996 Oman and Israel opened trade offices 
(which were closed in 2000). Omani and Israeli foreign 
affairs officials have regularly met unofficially since then.
This pragmatism was also present throughout Oman’s 
relations with its Yemeni neighbours. Diplomatic and 
economic exchanges were started with South Yemen from 
the late 1980s and Oman’s first informal contacts took 
place with the Soviet Union in November 1985. Not only did 
the sultan considered Moscow as an instigator of détente in 
South Yemen, but this was also an occasion for him to 
strengthen stability in Dhofar and demonstrate the inde-
pendence of his diplomacy vis-à-vis the GCC. In 1994, when 
the civil war broke out again in Yemen, the sultan initiated 
talks between the two sides in Salalah.
In 1976 Qaboos invited the Gulf countries’ ministers of 
foreign affairs (the future GCC states, plus Iraq and Iran) to 
discuss a regional joint security policy. At the Abu Dhabi 
summit that established the GCC in 1981 Oman reiterated 
its proposal for close security and defence collaboration 
among the six countries that would be based on a special 
partnership with the U.S., but said it opposed any transfor-
mation of the organisation into an anti-Iran coalition. 
Sultan Qaboos’s eternal gratitude for the shah’s decisive 
military effort during the Dhofar war was clearly a crucial 
factor here. Less inclined than his GCC counterparts to see 
in his domestic Shia minority an Iranian Trojan horse, 
Qaboos did not break diplomatic relations with Tehran after 
the 1979 Iranian revolution. He considered that he had no 
interest in presenting Iran as the sole source of regional 
tensions, because such an attitude could not lead to 
long-term stability and mutual cooperation. In 1987 the 
sultan’s special representative acted to smooth the way for 
diplomatic contacts between Iran and Iraq, and later Oman 
tried to convince Tehran to approve the UN resolution 
putting an end to the war between the two countries. It also 
offered to act as a go-between to help improve U.S.-Iran 
relations in 1987. In March 1991 Oman hosted a meeting at 
which Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations were restored. In 
September 1992 this led to an agreement between Oman 
and Iran to increase trade and economic cooperation.  
A memorandum of understanding was signed in June 1998 
to combat smuggling activities across the Strait of Hormuz. 
Since the 1990s official visits at ministerial level and below 
between the two countries take place on a semi-monthly 
basis.
Oman’s increasing dependence on Iran for gas has given it 
a particular interest in maintaining good relations with 
Tehran. In May 2006 accords on oil and gas cooperation 
were signed, allowing for Omani investment in Iran’s hydro-
carbons sector, the construction of a gas pipeline between 
Iran and Oman, the joint development of the Henjam/Bukha 
gas field, and the establishment of a joint oil company. In 
August 2009 Sultan Qaboos paid a three-day state visit to 
Tehran to promote trade between the two countries and 
possibly dialogue with the West. This first visit by the sultan 
to Iran since the overthrow of the shah was followed by 
another one in August 2013. In August 2010 Oman signed  
a defence cooperation agreement with Iran.
Oman also acted as a go-between in securing the release 
of U.S. nationals held by Iran, as well as Iranian nationals 
detained by Britain and the U.S. In 2010 and 2011 Oman 
successfully negotiated the release of three U.S. tourists 
arrested by the Iranian security forces for allegedly 
crossing into Iran illegally. In 2013 Oman mediated the 
release of an Iranian diplomat held in Britain for five years 
and an Iranian scientist detained by U.S. authorities. These 
cases illustrate Oman’s value to both the U.S. and Iran as  
a discreet and neutral intermediary. In an interview with  
a U.S. journalist in January 2012 Sultan Qaboos contended 
that Iran was not seeking conflict with the U.S. Oman 
supports Iran’s use of nuclear energy for peaceful purpos-
es and opposes the use of force against that country. 
However, Muscat does not support Iran’s claims to sover-
eignty over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb 
islands. Following the closure of Iranian and British 
diplomatic missions in London and Tehran in November 
2011, Oman represented Iran in Britain from June 2012.3
Preservation of national territory from  
any foreign interference 
This conciliatory approach has gone with an unfailing 
resolve to prevent any foreign actor from the region from 
interfering in Oman’s internal affairs. Just as “commu-
nism” was for long used as a label to discredit any people 
questioning the current political model, nowadays it is the 
“fight against Islamism” that is invoked by the regime to 
condemn without distinction every “breach of national 
security”. Contrary to its GCC neighbours, Oman has been 
reluctant to grant work permits to Nepalese, Palestinians, 
Syrians and Yemenis because of its obsession with the 
danger of the country being “infected” by socialist ideas. 
This “war on communism” even led Oman to establish 
unofficial diplomatic relations with what was then Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe) before 1980 (a number of former 
 Rhodesian officers served in the sultan’s forces during the 
Dhofar war) and to buy weapons from apartheid South 
Africa despite the embargo.
2 This constituted the first official visit by an Israeli minister to a Gulf Arab state since 1948.
3 On February 20th 2014 a British Foreign Office spokesperson announced that Britain and Iran had agreed that diplomatic ties would again be established between 
the two countries and “Oman will cease to be Iran’s protecting power in the UK”.
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While Muscat has held that the Iraq-Kuwait crisis should 
be a lesson for the GCC to prevent the emergence of future 
conflicts by strengthening multilateral links, it has always 
made sure to preserve its independence of decision in the 
name of national interest. The sultanate usually starts the 
month of Ramadan one day later than Riyadh. The fatwas 
fixing the date, proclaimed by Omani highest religious 
authorities, are officially justified by the country’s longitude 
and have a clear political significance. Similarly, Muscat 
has never joined OPEC, out of a desire to keep Oman’s – 
more symbolic than real – independence in working out its 
energy and budget needs. More generally the historical 
obsession of Omani rulers with direct Saudi involvement in 
Omani politics (inherited from the Saudis’ recurrent 
interests in the al-‘Ayn-Buraimi oasis since the end of the 
19th century and Riyadh’s active support of the Ibadi 
Imamate against Muscat authorities in the 1950s) is still 
present under Qaboos’s rule.
In January 2009 Oman announced that it would not join the 
GCC monetary union. Given the gap in living standards and 
wages between Oman and its GCC neighbours, a monetary 
union would have dramatic effects on the Omani economy. 
This position had no substantial damaging effects on 
Oman’s relationship with its neighbours, however, as both 
the GCC’s plans to set up an aid package worth $10 billion 
to help Oman cope with protests in March 2011 and Oman’s 
concomitant support for the Saudis’ and Emiratis’ decision 
to send troops to Bahrain demonstrated. In January 2014 
Sultan Qaboos also ratified by decree the security pact 
signed in Riyadh by GCC interior ministers in November 
2012, which strengthens cooperation and mutual assi-
stance in security matters. It allows the hunting down of 
those who are outside the law or the system, or who are 
wanted by party states, regardless of their nationalities, 
and the taking of necessary measures against them. It also 
allows the integration of signatories’ security apparatuses 
to provide support during times of security disturbances 
and unrest in a signatory state.
 
“Britain’s oldest friend on the Arabian Peninsula”4
The inescapable corollary of the desire to perpetuate an 
independent regional policy has been that Oman has never 
questioned its privileged partnership with Britain and the 
U.S. This close relationship with Britain in particular was 
responsible for the decision by Tariq bin Taimur, Qaboos’s 
uncle, to resign from his position of prime minister in 
December 1971.
Although British forces officially left Omani bases in 1977,  
a few months after Iran’s withdrawal of its forces, the 
regular renewal of the military cooperation agreements 
with both Britain and the U.S. and joint Omani-British 
military exercises – such as the one in 2001, which was the 
largest deployment of British troops abroad since the 
1980s – only confirmed Oman’s alignment with U.S. and 
British priorities, which is closer than any other GCC 
countries.
After the attacks in the U.S. on September 11th 2001 the 
U.S. military presence in Oman dramatically increased to 
4,300 personnel in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan. In 2002 Oman advocated a diplomatic 
solution to the escalating crisis, but hosted up to three U.S. 
Air Force expeditionary wings supporting military opera-
tions in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the Masirah and Seeb 
bases were the only ones in the Arabian Peninsula used in 
2003 as operational bases by the coalition during the air 
offensive against Iraq (as had also been the case in 1991).
Until 2011 Oman had been particularly successful in 
preventing the convulsions of the region from impacting on 
its internal political dynamics. A necessary condition of the 
country’s independent foreign policy towards its regional 
neighbours and the preservation of its sovereignty from 
foreign interference by the latter in its internal affairs has 
been the maintenance of a special relationship with Britain 
and to a lesser extent the U.S, together with their regional 
allies (Iran before 1979; Egypt and Jordan currently). Even 
if it causes recurrent criticism or frustration in other GCC 
countries and inside Oman, this partnership is the key that 
has granted the Omani ruler freedom of action in the 
region and at home. However, this policy comes at a huge 
cost. In December 2012 British prime minister David 
Cameron announced that Oman had signed a $4.1 billion 
contract to buy 20 aircraft from BAE Systems. The third 
visit of British secretary of state for foreign and Common-
wealth affairs Alistair Burt to Oman in February 2013 was 
an occasion to remind the world that Britain remains the 
largest foreign investor in Oman. Another $1.5 billion deal 
with the U.S. manufacturer Raytheon for the acquisition of 
an air-defence system received formal approval from the 
Omani government when U.S. secretary of state John Kerry 
visited Muscat in May 2013. Defence and national security 
forces consumed 35% of the state’s expenditure in 2012, 
and consumed 11.7% of the country’s gross domestic 
product in 2013 – one of the world’s highest rates. Accord-
ing to the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute, Oman increased its defence spending by 51% in 2012 
– the largest such increase worldwide.
4 A statement that appeared in The Times (London) in 1974.
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